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We investigate a decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme with a sub-Poissonian single-photon
source, which is generated on demand by scattering a coherent state off a two-level system in a one-dimensional
waveguide. We show that, compared to coherent state decoy-state QKD, there is a two-fold increase of the key
generation rate. Furthermore, the performance is shown to be robust against both parameter variations and
loss effects of the system. c© 2018 Optical Society of America
OCIS codes: 270.5290, 270.5565, 270.5568
Quantum key distribution (QKD), which allows two dis-
tant users, Alice and Bob, to share a secret key with
security guaranteed by principles of quantum physics, is
the first commercially available application of quantum
information science. The first QKD protocol, BB84 [1],
proposes to use an ideal single-photon source, which is
still beyond the current technology despite tremendous
experimental effort worldwide. Hence, most QKD ex-
periments use weak coherent states (WCS) from atten-
uated lasers as a photon source [2, 3]. Two drawbacks
come with the WCS: the multiphoton and the vacuum
components. The vacuum content limits Bob’s detection
rate, and hence leads to a shorter maximal distance. The
multiphoton component makes QKD vulnerable to the
photon number splitting attack, where the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) can suppress single-photon signals and split
multiphoton signals, keeping one copy and sending one
copy to Bob. This way, Eve obtains the full information
without being detected, and the unconditional security
breaks down. The decoy state method was proposed to
beat such attacks [4–6]: Alice prepares additional decoy
states, and learns about the eavesdropping from their
transmission. Recently, alternative light sources, includ-
ing spontaneous parametric down-conversion [7] and her-
alded single-photons [8], have been used in decoy-state
QKD.
In this paper, we combine the decoy-state method with
a sub-Poissonian single-photon source generated on de-
mand by scattering in a waveguide. We find that there
is a substantial increase in the key generation rate and
maximal transmission distance compared to both WCS
and heralded single-photon decoy-state QKD. Further-
more, the performance is robust against either parame-
ter variation or loss in the system, making it a promising
candidate for future QKD systems.
Recently, strong coupling between light and matter
has been achieved in a variety of one-dimensional (1D)
waveguide-QED systems [9–12]. This great experimen-
tal progress has stimulated extensive theoretical study
of nonlinear effects in such systems for the purpose of
quantum information processing [13–18]. One example,
on which we base this work, is to generate nonclassi-
cal light [11, 19] by sending a coherent state into a 1D
waveguide which is side-coupled to a quantum nonlinear
element, such as a two-level system (2LS) [13, 14]. The
nonlinearity of the quantum element leads to a distinct
difference between multiphoton and single-photon scat-
tering. For example, when two photons interact with a
2LS simultaneously, the 2LS will only be able to absorb
one photon and hence the pair will have a high transmis-
sion probability, leading to photon bunching and super-
Poissonian photon statistics [11, 19]. Here, we focus on
the reflected field, and show that it has sub-Poissonian
statistics.
Figure 1 shows the probabilities Pn to measure n-
photon states in the reflected field after scattering a
coherent state off the 2LS. We will call such a photon
source the “2LS source”. The input coherent state has
mean photon number n¯ = 1. We take a Gaussian wave-
packet with central frequency on resonance with the 2LS
and root-mean-square spectral width σ. The model we
use is presented in detail in Ref. 19. It includes absorp-
tion of photons by the 2LS and subsequent spontaneous
emission into the waveguide mode at rate Γ. In addition,
a loss rate Γ′ models subsequent emission into modes
other than the waveguide mode (as well as possible non-
radiative processes) [13, 19]. The loss rate Γ′ decreases
the number of photons in the waveguide, thus changing
the number statistics. When Γ′ is small compared to σ
and Γ, multi-photon loss is negligible: the loss from an
n-photon pulse appears as an n − 1 photon pulse, for
which we then naturally use the n− 1 photon transmis-
sion and reflection to distribute the probability between
the transmitted and reflected fields.
We set the effective Purcell factor P = Γ/Γ′ = 20 [12]
for now, and return to the effect of loss later. For com-
parison, we also show Pn (dashed line) of a coherent state
with the same mean photon number as the reflected field.
1
It is remarkable that, for the full parameter range, the
reflected field has higher single-photon and lower vac-
uum and multiphoton content than the coherent state.
In the insert of Fig. 1, we show that the multiphoton
content is strongly suppressed at σ = Γ/2. This is in
agreement with the observed antibunching behavior of
microwave photons [11], and is the key to increasing the
key generation rate.
Now, we discuss the decoy-state method with light
sources, including weak coherent states, a heralded
single-photon source (HSPS), and the 2LS source
(2LSS). The secure key generation rate (per signal pulse
emitted by Alice) is given by [20]
R ≥ q{−Qsf(Es)H2(Es) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]}, (1)
where the efficiency q is 1/2 for the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol, f(Es) is the error correction effi-
ciency (we use f = 1.22 [21]), Qs and Es are the overall
gain and error rate of signal states, respectively, Q1 and
e1 are the gain and error rate of single-photon states, re-
spectively, and H2(x) is the binary Shannon information
function: H2(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1− x)log2(1 − x).
In Eq. (1), while Qs and Es are measurable quantities
in experiments, Q1 and e1 are unknown variables. Qs
and Es are given by
Qs =
∞∑
n=0
psnYn, Es =
1
Qs
∞∑
n=0
psnYnen, (2)
where psn is the n-photon probability of signal states, en
is the error rate of an n-photon state, and Yn is the n-
photon yield, i.e., the conditional probability of a click on
Bob’s side given that Alice has sent an n-photon state.
To generate a lower bound on the key generation rate,
we have to estimate a lower bound of Q1 (or equivalently
Y1 as Q1 = p
s
1
Y1) and an upper bound of e1. Estimat-
ing the lower bound Y l
1
and the upper bound eu
1
based
solely on Eq. (2) unavoidably underestimates the secure
key generation rate due to the lack of enough informa-
tion about the transmission channel. The decoy-state
idea [4–6] is a clever way to obtain additional channel
information by sending in additional decoy states. The
decoy states are used to detect eavesdropping, but not for
key generation. By measuring the transmission of the de-
coy states, Alice and Bob have another set of constraints
Qd =
∞∑
n=0
pdnYn, Ed =
1
Qd
∞∑
n=0
pdnYnen, (3)
where Qd and Ed are the measured overall gain and error
rate of decoy states, respectively. Because Eve has no
way to distinguish an n-photon decoy state from an n-
photon signal state, the yield Yn and the error rate en
are the same for both the decoy and signal states.
For our numerical simulation, we use the channel
model in Ref. 22 to calculate the experimental param-
eters Qs, Es, Qd, and Ed. In this model, the yield
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Fig. 1. (Color online) Nonclassical light source. The num-
ber statistics Pn of the 2LS source (2LSS, solid), and a
coherent state (CS, dashed) of the same mean photon
number as a function of Γ/σ. Inset: Pn at σ = Γ/2.
Here, we set P = Γ/Γ′ = 20.
is Yn = 1 − (1 − Y0)(1 − η)
n, where Y0 is the back-
ground rate and η is the overall transmittance given
by η = tABηBob, where tAB = 10
−αℓ/10 is the chan-
nel transmittance and ηBob is the detection efficiency
on Bob’s side. Here, α is the loss coefficient and ℓ is
the transmission distance. The error rate is given by
en = [e0Y0 + ed(Yn − Y0)]/Yn, where ed is the proba-
bility that a photon hits the wrong detector and e0 is
the error rate of the background. We use the experimen-
tal parameters in Ref. 23: α = 0.21dB/km, ed = 3.3%,
Y0 = 1.7× 10
−6, e0 = 0.5, and ηBob = 0.045.
We apply the linear programming method [24] to esti-
mate Y l
1
and eu
1
from Eqs. (2) and (3). This method is ap-
plicable to light sources with general number statistics.
We use two decoy states—the vacuum and a weak decoy
state. For the weak coherent states, the key generation
rate is optimized in terms of the mean photon number
in both the signal and decoy states [22]. For the her-
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Key generation rate with differ-
ent light sources: weak coherent state (WCS), heralded
single-photon source (HSPS), and 2LS source (2LSS)
with σ = Γ/2 and P = 20.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Key generation rate of 2LS
sources with parameter variation and loss: (a) σ =
5Γ, 2Γ,Γ, 0.5Γ. Inset: maximal transmission distance
(ℓmax) as a function Γ/σ. P = Γ/Γ
′ = 20; (b) P =
2, 5, 10, 20. Inset: ℓmax as a function of P . σ = Γ/2.
alded single-photons, we use the number statistics from
Ref. 8. For the 2LS source, the signal and decoy states
are generated by scattering coherent states of n¯ = 1 and
n¯ = 0.02, respectively. We choose σ = Γ/2.
Figure 2 shows the resulting key generation rate. With
the same experimental parameters and estimation tech-
nique, our scheme using the 2LS source obtains a two-
fold increasing of key generation rate compared to the
WCS method. The maximal transmission distance is in-
creased as well. In addition, our scheme also outperforms
the HSPS scheme. Such a performance enhancement is
due to the reduced vacuum and multiphoton contents,
as shown in Fig. 1.
Next, we investigate the robustness of our scheme with
respect to the variation of system parameter Γ/σ. As
shown in Fig. 3(a), the key generation rate gradually con-
verges as Γ/σ increases. In particular, the insert shows
that the maximal transmission distance (ℓmax) has little
change for Γ/σ ≥ 1.
The effect of loss on the system performance is shown
in Figure 3(b). We fix σ = Γ/2 and choose different loss
rates Γ′ of the 2LS. In Fig. 3(b), we observe that, as P in-
creases, the key generation rate increases and converges.
It is evident that, for P ≥ 10, the performance is very
reliable against loss as shown in the insert. Given that
values of P as large as 20 have already been achieved in
recent experiments [12,25], our scheme can be practically
useful for quantum key distribution.
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